[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$ffjl9-FcxXg4xwxGmrGiSnVLJoHxgJyGGuiVbaiOoAdY":3},{"id":4,"question":5,"answer":6,"answerHtml":7,"slug":8,"keywords":9,"article":10,"status":34,"aiModel":39,"aiConfidence":39,"updatedAt":51,"createdAt":51,"_status":50},629,"What is the permission vulnerability in TeamViewer 13.0.5058?","The vulnerability in TeamViewer 13.0.5058 allows an attacker to modify permission settings in the TeamViewer process through [DLL injection and memory manipulation](\u002Fnews\u002Ftesting-the-permission-vulnerability-in-teamviewer-13-0-5058). This can enable unauthorized reverse control of a connected client or unlock disabled mouse\u002Fkeyboard controls, bypassing normal permission checks.","\u003Cp>The vulnerability in TeamViewer 13.0.5058 allows an attacker to modify permission settings in the TeamViewer process through [DLL injection and memory manipulation](\u002Fnews\u002Ftesting-the-permission-vulnerability-in-teamviewer-13-0-5058). This can enable unauthorized reverse control of a connected client or unlock disabled mouse\u002Fkeyboard controls, bypassing normal permission checks.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Ca href=\"\u002Fnews\u002Ftesting-the-permission-vulnerability-in-teamviewer-13-0-5058\">Read the related One Day Sec article\u003C\u002Fa>\u003C\u002Fp>","what-is-the-permission-vulnerability-in-teamviewer-1305058-1777482542410","TeamViewer 13.0.5058, permission vulnerability, DLL injection, memory manipulation",{"id":11,"title":12,"slug":13,"description":14,"content":15,"contentHtml":30,"cover":31,"author":32,"views":19,"readingTime":33,"status":34,"publishedAt":35,"seo":36,"tags":41,"qaPairs":42,"meta":47,"updatedAt":48,"createdAt":49,"_status":50},155,"Testing the Permission Vulnerability in TeamViewer 13.0.5058","testing-the-permission-vulnerability-in-teamviewer-13-0-5058","Testing and analysis of TeamViewer 13.0.5058 permission vulnerability. Includes POC verification, exploit methods, and defense recommendations for unauthorized access.",{"root":16},{"type":17,"format":18,"indent":19,"version":20,"children":21,"direction":29},"root","",0,1,[22],{"type":23,"format":18,"indent":19,"version":20,"children":24,"direction":29},"paragraph",[25],{"mode":26,"text":27,"type":28,"style":18,"detail":19,"format":19,"version":20},"normal","\u003Chtml>\u003Chead>\u003C\u002Fhead>\u003Cbody>\u003Ch2>0x00 Preface\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>---\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>On December 5th, TeamViewer released a new version 13.0.5640, fixing a bug present in the previous version 13.0.5058.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Subsequently, gellin uploaded a POC for this vulnerability on GitHub, and the security information website ThreatPost reported on the situation.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>However, at first glance, the vulnerability description and POC were difficult to understand. Therefore, this article conducted further testing, verified the POC, and drew conclusions.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>POC:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgellin\u002FTeamViewer_Permissions_Hook_V1\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>ThreatPost Report:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>https:\u002F\u002Fthreatpost.com\u002Fteamviewer-rushes-fix-for-permissions-bug\u002F129096\u002F\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>0x01 Introduction\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>---\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>This article will cover the following:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cul>\u003Cli>POC Testing\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>Brief Analysis of the Principle\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>Exploitation Approach\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>Defense\u003C\u002Fli>\u003C\u002Ful>\u003Ch2>0x02 POC Testing\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>---\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch3>1. Compile and generate DLL\u003C\u002Fh3>\u003Cp>The POC is developed in C++. When compiling with VS2012, the following bug occurs:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>error C2784: 'std::_String_iterator<_Mystr> std::operator +(_String_iterator<_Mystr>::difference_type,std::_String_iterator<_Mystr>)': could not deduce template argument for 'std::_String_iterator<_Mystr>' from 'std::string'\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Location of the bug:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgellin\u002FTeamViewer_Permissions_Hook_V1\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002FTeamViewerHook_13_0_3711_88039\u002Fmain.cpp#L25\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The bug occurs because the author used a higher version of Visual Studio. Moreover, this code segment's function is output, so it can be ignored. The modified code is as follows:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ctable>\u003Ctbody>\u003Ctr>\u003Ctd>\u003Cp>console = new Console(std::string(BANNER), std::string(\"TeamViewer Permissions Hook v1\"));\u003C\u002Fp>\u003C\u002Ftd>\u003C\u002Ftr>\u003C\u002Ftbody>\u003C\u002Ftable>\u003Cp>Compilation successful, generating TeamViewerHook_13_0_3711_88039.dll\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch3>2. Test environment setup\u003C\u002Fh3>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Host 1 (Server):\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Operating System: Win8 x86\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Install TeamViewer 13.0.5058\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>As the controlled end, ID is 543 847 147, password is 49s4eb\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Host 2 (Client):\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Operating System: Win8 x86\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Install TeamViewer 13.0.5058\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>As the controlling end, used for remote connection to Host 1\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch3>3. Test Function A: Host 1 (Server) reverse controls Host 2 (Client)\u003C\u002Fh3>\u003Cp>Host 2 (Client) enters ID and password, successfully remotely connects to Host 1 (Server)\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>As shown in the figure below\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cimg alt=\"Alt text\" src=\"\u002Fuploads\u002Fdocx_image_1770017302753_0_05141959c9.jpeg\">\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Note:\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>A normal function supported by TeamViewer: Host 2 (Client) selects Communication - Switch roles with partner control, can switch roles, allowing Host 1 (Server) to reverse control Host 2 (Client), as shown in the figure below\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cimg alt=\"Alt text\" src=\"\u002Fuploads\u002Fdocx_image_1770017326619_1_d0e37c5850.jpeg\">\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>First function of the POC: Achieve unauthorized reverse control of Host 2 (Client) by Host 1 (Server)\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Process is as follows:\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>On Host 1 (Server), inject TeamViewerHook_13_0_3711_88039.dll into the TeamViewer process\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>APC injection can be used here, code reference:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>an open-source project\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Before DLL injection, click the session list on Host 1 (Server), as shown below\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cimg alt=\"Alt text\" src=\"\u002Fuploads\u002Fdocx_image_1770017377913_2_41e3e5f783.jpeg\">\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Proceed with DLL injection, follow the prompt to press NUMPAD 1, select Host\u002FServer, as shown below\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cimg alt=\"Alt text\" src=\"\u002Fuploads\u002Fdocx_image_1770017396316_3_5905e3a1ac.jpeg\">\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Click the session list on Host 1 (Server) again, the list is modified, as shown below\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cimg alt=\"Alt text\" src=\"\u002Fuploads\u002Fdocx_image_1770017441584_4_a48de78c4b.jpeg\">\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Select 'Switch Roles' to enable Host 1 (Server) to control Host 2 (Client) in reverse\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch3>4. Test Function B: Host 2 (Client) unlocks mouse and keyboard\u003C\u002Fh3>\u003Cp>Similar to Test A, Host 2 (Client) enters ID and password, successfully establishes remote connection to Host 1 (Server)\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Host 1 (Server) disables remote mouse control from Host 2 (Client) by configuring the session list, as shown below\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cimg alt=\"Alt text\" src=\"\u002Fuploads\u002Fdocx_image_1770017466975_5_f37a869160.jpeg\">\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Under normal circumstances, Host 2 (Client) cannot use the mouse to remotely control Host 1 (Server)\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Second function of the POC: Unauthorized unlocking of the mouse on Host 2 (Server) to remotely control Host 1 (Server)\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Next, perform DLL injection. Follow the prompt to press NUMPAD 2 and select client, as shown below\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cimg alt=\"Alt text\" src=\"\u002Fuploads\u002Fdocx_image_1770017480384_6_0f22f728b9.jpeg\">\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Successfully unlocked the mouse and remotely controlled Host 1 (Server), as shown below\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cimg alt=\"Alt text\" src=\"\u002Fuploads\u002Fdocx_image_1770017489835_7_ba532d72c4.jpeg\">\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>0x03 Brief Analysis of the Principle\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>---\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Through DLL injection, search the memory of the target process, locate the pointer address representing permissions, reassign its value, and perform a naked inline hook to achieve permission modification\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The modified memory structure is shown below\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cimg alt=\"Alt text\" src=\"\u002Fuploads\u002Fdocx_image_1770017499964_8_48cb0431a3.jpeg\">\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>For specific implementation methods, refer to the source code\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch1>0x04 Exploitation Ideas\u003C\u002Fh1>\u003Cp>---\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch3>1. Function A: Host 1 (Server) reverse-controlling Host 2 (Client)\u003C\u002Fh3>\u003Cp>If Host 1 (Server) successfully reverse-controls Host 2 (Client) through a vulnerability, by default, the desktop of Host 2 (Client) will display as being controlled\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>However, since DLL injection can modify the memory data of the TeamViewer process, it is also possible to control the desktop display content of Host 2 (Client) by altering memory data (e.g., black screen, normal screen (not recommended), etc.)\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The publicly available POC does not implement the function to control the desktop display content of Host 2 (Client). Considering the severity of this vulnerability, this article will not detail the specific methods for converting POC to EXP.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch3>2. Function B: Host 2 (Client) unlocks mouse and keyboard\u003C\u002Fh3>\u003Cp>The prerequisite for this function is that Host 2 (Client) has successfully established a remote connection to Host 1 (Server). It only takes effect when Host 1 (Server) chooses to disable the mouse of Host 2 (Client).\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>0x05 Defense Strategies\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>---\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>1. It is recommended that users upgrade to the new TeamViewer version 13.0.5640\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Note:\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>As of the writing of this article, TeamViewer's official website has not yet released specific details about this upgrade version. The address is as follows:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>https:\u002F\u002Fwww.teamviewer.com\u002Fen\u002Fdownload\u002Fchangelog\u002F\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>2. Do not connect to unknown TeamViewer servers arbitrarily\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>0x06 Summary\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>---\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>This article tests the POC for the privilege vulnerability in TeamViewer 13.0.5058, briefly introduces its principles and exploitation ideas, and provides defense recommendations.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003C\u002Fbody>\u003C\u002Fhtml>","text","ltr","\u003Chtml>\u003Chead>\u003C\u002Fhead>\u003Cbody>\u003Ch2>0x00 Preface\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>---\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>On December 5th, TeamViewer released a new version 13.0.5640, fixing a bug present in the previous version 13.0.5058.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Subsequently, gellin uploaded a POC for this vulnerability on GitHub, and the security information website ThreatPost reported on the situation.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>However, at first glance, the vulnerability description and POC were difficult to understand. Therefore, this article conducted further testing, verified the POC, and drew conclusions.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>POC:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgellin\u002FTeamViewer_Permissions_Hook_V1\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>ThreatPost Report:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>https:\u002F\u002Fthreatpost.com\u002Fteamviewer-rushes-fix-for-permissions-bug\u002F129096\u002F\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>0x01 Introduction\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>---\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>This article will cover the following:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cul>\u003Cli>POC Testing\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>Brief Analysis of the Principle\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>Exploitation Approach\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>Defense\u003C\u002Fli>\u003C\u002Ful>\u003Ch2>0x02 POC Testing\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>---\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch3>1. Compile and generate DLL\u003C\u002Fh3>\u003Cp>The POC is developed in C++. When compiling with VS2012, the following bug occurs:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>error C2784: 'std::_String_iterator<_Mystr> std::operator +(_String_iterator<_Mystr>::difference_type,std::_String_iterator<_Mystr>)': could not deduce template argument for 'std::_String_iterator<_Mystr>' from 'std::string'\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Location of the bug:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgellin\u002FTeamViewer_Permissions_Hook_V1\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002FTeamViewerHook_13_0_3711_88039\u002Fmain.cpp#L25\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The bug occurs because the author used a higher version of Visual Studio. Moreover, this code segment's function is output, so it can be ignored. The modified code is as follows:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ctable>\u003Ctbody>\u003Ctr>\u003Ctd>\u003Cp>console = new Console(std::string(BANNER), std::string(\"TeamViewer Permissions Hook v1\"));\u003C\u002Fp>\u003C\u002Ftd>\u003C\u002Ftr>\u003C\u002Ftbody>\u003C\u002Ftable>\u003Cp>Compilation successful, generating TeamViewerHook_13_0_3711_88039.dll\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch3>2. Test environment setup\u003C\u002Fh3>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Host 1 (Server):\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Operating System: Win8 x86\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Install TeamViewer 13.0.5058\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>As the controlled end, ID is 543 847 147, password is 49s4eb\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Host 2 (Client):\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Operating System: Win8 x86\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Install TeamViewer 13.0.5058\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>As the controlling end, used for remote connection to Host 1\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch3>3. Test Function A: Host 1 (Server) reverse controls Host 2 (Client)\u003C\u002Fh3>\u003Cp>Host 2 (Client) enters ID and password, successfully remotely connects to Host 1 (Server)\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>As shown in the figure below\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cimg alt=\"Alt text\" src=\"\u002Fapi\u002Fmedia\u002Ffile\u002Fdocx_image_1770017302753_0_05141959c9-1.jpeg\">\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Note:\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>A normal function supported by TeamViewer: Host 2 (Client) selects Communication - Switch roles with partner control, can switch roles, allowing Host 1 (Server) to reverse control Host 2 (Client), as shown in the figure below\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cimg alt=\"Alt text\" src=\"\u002Fapi\u002Fmedia\u002Ffile\u002Fdocx_image_1770017326619_1_d0e37c5850-1.jpeg\">\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>First function of the POC: Achieve unauthorized reverse control of Host 2 (Client) by Host 1 (Server)\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Process is as follows:\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>On Host 1 (Server), inject TeamViewerHook_13_0_3711_88039.dll into the TeamViewer process\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>APC injection can be used here, code reference:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>an open-source project\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Before DLL injection, click the session list on Host 1 (Server), as shown below\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cimg alt=\"Alt text\" src=\"\u002Fapi\u002Fmedia\u002Ffile\u002Fdocx_image_1770017377913_2_41e3e5f783-1.jpeg\">\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Proceed with DLL injection, follow the prompt to press NUMPAD 1, select Host\u002FServer, as shown below\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cimg alt=\"Alt text\" src=\"\u002Fapi\u002Fmedia\u002Ffile\u002Fdocx_image_1770017396316_3_5905e3a1ac-1.jpeg\">\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Click the session list on Host 1 (Server) again, the list is modified, as shown below\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cimg alt=\"Alt text\" src=\"\u002Fapi\u002Fmedia\u002Ffile\u002Fdocx_image_1770017441584_4_a48de78c4b-1.jpeg\">\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Select 'Switch Roles' to enable Host 1 (Server) to control Host 2 (Client) in reverse\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch3>4. Test Function B: Host 2 (Client) unlocks mouse and keyboard\u003C\u002Fh3>\u003Cp>Similar to Test A, Host 2 (Client) enters ID and password, successfully establishes remote connection to Host 1 (Server)\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Host 1 (Server) disables remote mouse control from Host 2 (Client) by configuring the session list, as shown below\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cimg alt=\"Alt text\" src=\"\u002Fapi\u002Fmedia\u002Ffile\u002Fdocx_image_1770017466975_5_f37a869160-1.jpeg\">\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Under normal circumstances, Host 2 (Client) cannot use the mouse to remotely control Host 1 (Server)\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Second function of the POC: Unauthorized unlocking of the mouse on Host 2 (Server) to remotely control Host 1 (Server)\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Next, perform DLL injection. Follow the prompt to press NUMPAD 2 and select client, as shown below\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cimg alt=\"Alt text\" src=\"\u002Fapi\u002Fmedia\u002Ffile\u002Fdocx_image_1770017480384_6_0f22f728b9-1.jpeg\">\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Successfully unlocked the mouse and remotely controlled Host 1 (Server), as shown below\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cimg alt=\"Alt text\" src=\"\u002Fapi\u002Fmedia\u002Ffile\u002Fdocx_image_1770017489835_7_ba532d72c4-1.jpeg\">\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>0x03 Brief Analysis of the Principle\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>---\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Through DLL injection, search the memory of the target process, locate the pointer address representing permissions, reassign its value, and perform a naked inline hook to achieve permission modification\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The modified memory structure is shown below\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cimg alt=\"Alt text\" src=\"\u002Fapi\u002Fmedia\u002Ffile\u002Fdocx_image_1770017499964_8_48cb0431a3-1.jpeg\">\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>For specific implementation methods, refer to the source code\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch1>0x04 Exploitation Ideas\u003C\u002Fh1>\u003Cp>---\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch3>1. Function A: Host 1 (Server) reverse-controlling Host 2 (Client)\u003C\u002Fh3>\u003Cp>If Host 1 (Server) successfully reverse-controls Host 2 (Client) through a vulnerability, by default, the desktop of Host 2 (Client) will display as being controlled\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>However, since DLL injection can modify the memory data of the TeamViewer process, it is also possible to control the desktop display content of Host 2 (Client) by altering memory data (e.g., black screen, normal screen (not recommended), etc.)\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The publicly available POC does not implement the function to control the desktop display content of Host 2 (Client). Considering the severity of this vulnerability, this article will not detail the specific methods for converting POC to EXP.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch3>2. Function B: Host 2 (Client) unlocks mouse and keyboard\u003C\u002Fh3>\u003Cp>The prerequisite for this function is that Host 2 (Client) has successfully established a remote connection to Host 1 (Server). It only takes effect when Host 1 (Server) chooses to disable the mouse of Host 2 (Client).\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>0x05 Defense Strategies\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>---\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>1. It is recommended that users upgrade to the new TeamViewer version 13.0.5640\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Note:\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>As of the writing of this article, TeamViewer's official website has not yet released specific details about this upgrade version. The address is as follows:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>https:\u002F\u002Fwww.teamviewer.com\u002Fen\u002Fdownload\u002Fchangelog\u002F\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>2. Do not connect to unknown TeamViewer servers arbitrarily\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>0x06 Summary\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>---\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>This article tests the POC for the privilege vulnerability in TeamViewer 13.0.5058, briefly introduces its principles and exploitation ideas, and provides defense recommendations.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003C\u002Fbody>\u003C\u002Fhtml>",884,"Onedaysec",4,"published","2026-02-02T07:38:21.454Z",{"title":37,"description":14,"keywords":38,"ogImage":39,"canonicalUrl":39,"noIndex":40},"TeamViewer 13.0.5058 Permission Vulnerability Testing & POC Analysis","TeamViewer vulnerability, permission bypass, POC testing, DLL injection, remote control exploit, security bug, reverse control, mouse unlock",null,false,[],{"docs":43,"hasNextPage":40},[44,45,46,4],632,631,630,{"title":39,"description":39,"image":39},"2026-07-24T15:37:12.268Z","2026-07-23T16:01:52.372Z","draft","2026-07-23T16:13:52.749Z"]